In the case of Iraq, it would be difficult to go it alone, but it’s theoretically possible to achieve our goals in Iraq unilaterally. Nevertheless, by contrast, the war against terrorism manifestly requires a multilateral approach. It is impossible to succeed against terrorism unless we have secured the continuing, sustained co-operation of many nations. I believe that this is unfortunate, because in the immediate aftermath of 11 September, more than a year ago, we had an enormous reservoir of goodwill and sympathy and shared resolve all over the world. That has been squandered in a year’s time and replaced with great anxiety all around the world, not primarily about what the terrorist networks are going to do, but about what we’re going to do.Now, my point is not that they’re right to feel that way, but that they do feel that way And that has consequences for us.

Squandering all that goodwill and replacing it with anxiety in a year’s time is similar to what was done by turning a $100bn surplus into a $200bn deficit in a year’s time.If we quickly succeed in a war against the weakened and depleted fourth-rate military of Iraq, and then quickly abandon that nation, then the resulting chaos in the aftermath of a military victory in Iraq could easily pose a far greater danger to the United States than we presently face from Saddam.Here’s why I say that. We know that he has stored away secret supplies of biological weapons and chemical weapons throughout his country. What if the al-Qa’ida members infiltrated across the borders of Iraq the way they are in Afghanistan? Then the question wouldn’t be: “Is Saddam Hussein going to share these weapons with a terrorist group?” The terrorist groups would have an enhanced ability to just walk in there and get them.. When Jack Straw spoke about the twin towers attack in the Commons last year, a peculiar emphasis in his voice when he spoke about nuclear, chemical and biological weapons made it clear that the Government wanted to invade Iraq: they have been planning this eye-catching initiative for a long time. They assumed evidence would spill out of 11 September and provide the justification for whacking Saddam.

There’s nothing new in the Prime Minister’s dossier, and delaying its publication to the morning of the debate raised suspicions that the material is in some way tainted (the Government’s reputation in such matters is as fragrant as dead, or least very sick, fish).So we had high hopes of a rebellion. Maybe Robin Cook would resign from the Cabinet to lead it, or maybe Clare Short? Yet more likely, would vertical take-off pigs perform aerial acrobatics over the Treasury benches?No, parliamentary management and the Prime Minister’s thespian skills carried the day. Tam Dalyell tried a procedure to get a substantive vote at the end of the debate He failed. In what way success would have been better wasn’t made clear. Tony Blair’s statement was received in respectful silence with one or two dense “Amens” from his back benchers.